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Abstract 
Integrated Assessment Models provide a framework to study sustainability transitions 
and their economic impacts. Models seldom consider energy constraints, taking supply 
availability for granted and thus suggesting a mere change in the energy mix from non-renewables 
to renewables. In order to address these limitations, a macro-economic module within a broader 
system dynamics model (MEDEAS) has been developed. The model has been run for the whole 
world from 1995 to 2050 under three different scenarios: Business as Usual (BAU), considering 
no further transition policies and keeping current trends; Green Growth (GG), undertaking the 
low-carbon transition according to the Paris Agreement set of policies and with high GDP growth 
standards; and Post-Growth (PG), testing the sustainability transition under a GDP non-
growth/degrowth approach.  The results reveal the conflict between economic growth, climate 
policy and the sustainability of resources. Whereas a BAU approach would not even be an option 
to achieve climate goals, a GG view would not only face the downsizing of economic output, but 
neither would it be able to achieve the 2ºC objective. The success of the PG approach in meeting 
emissions objectives suggests a redirection from economic growth policies to an industrial policy 
that incorporates efficiency and redistribution.   
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1. Introduction  
Climate change is rapidly moving from being a potential, abstract threat to becoming a 
harmful reality. As a result, transitions towards sustainability, or low-carbon transitions, have 
emerged with a broadening body of literature (Markaard, Raven and Truffer, 2012). We define a 
low-carbon transition as the process aimed at a shift in the energy resources ant technologies that 
a society relies upon in order to achieve a state where zero or low carbon emissions are required 
to sustain the socioeconomic system (i.e. a low-carbon economy). Moreover, the international 
community is attempting to cope with climate change through different Conferences of Parties 
(COPs). The most relevant conference in recent years was COP21, where the Paris Agreement 
was signed. This agreement established as its main objective to “hold the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2oC above pre-industrial levels”. Despite the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stating that, in order to avoid surpassing the 
2ºC threshold, carbon emissions would have to be reduced between 41% and 72% by 2050 with 
respect to 2010 (IPCC, 2014), the Paris Agreement commitments deliver net increases, until at 
least (Rogelj et al., 2016; Raftery et al., 2017; Nieto, Carpintero and Miguel, 2018). Given the 
close relationship between emissions and energy consumption, any assessment of the economy’s 
capacity to meet climate goals requires strong Energy-Economy-Environment (EEE) models, 
within the broader definition of Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). Nevertheless, the concept 
of limits is rarely considered by either policy-makers or academic IAMs. Furthermore, ecological 
economics states that there are biophysical boundaries that the economy cannot exceed (Daly, 
1968; Costanza, 1989, 1991; Farley and Daly, 2003). The analysis of Integrated Assessment 
Models (IAMs) is often split into two different approaches concerning the common features of 
how they characterize the economy, namely: optimization and simulation models  (Scrieciu, Rezai 
and Mechler, 2013). 
On the one hand, optimization models tend to use neoclassical production functions -
standard Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions- that assume perfect substitutability 
of productive factors, that markets clear and that a general equilibrium is reached.  Optimization 
models assume well-behaved markets, coordinated via prices, and being the main driver of 
technological change and the focus of macroeconomic policies (e.g. carbon prices). Due to the 
usual convergence to markets equilibrium in these models, computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models are the most representative amongst optimization model. Although they sometimes 
allow for multiple inferior equilibriums, their optimal growth (Sterman et al., 2012) path 
enforcing convergence towards full employment lead to superior equilibriums. However, despite 
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their common use, these models have been widely criticised for not being grounded in the 
complex and dynamic reality.  
On the other hand, simulation models rely on a different approach. The main contribution 
of simulation models is that they describe EEE relationships in a way that allow the propagation 
of disturbances into the system to be examined and the outcomes of the different policies to be 
evaluated. Simulation models do not optimize i.e. do not follow an optimum path, implying that 
markets do not necessarily clear, i.e. are in equilibrium. They conduct observation-based 
economic interactions modelling and provide more freedom to assess different phenomena 
(Scrieciu, Rezai and Mechler, 2013). Simulation models are often policy evaluation models and 
are not prescriptive as optimization ones are. Policies are not only market-driven, so institutions 
play an important role in policies definition. They pay special attention to income distribution and 
demand-led growth (as opposed as supply-driven in optimization models). Demand-led models 
are commonly sustained in Keynesian or post-Keynesian economics assuming disequilibrium, 
meaning non-clearing markets, demand-led growth although subject to certain supply constraints 
(Lavoie, 2014; Taylor, Rezai and Foley, 2016).  As simulation fits better with dynamic modelling 
and disequilibrium economics, a number of models have been grounded on these approaches. 
Some examples are the non-equilibrium E3MG model (Pollit, 2014), ICAM (Dowlatabadi, 1998), 
GTEM (Kemfert, 2005), AIM (Kainuma, 2003; Morita et al., 2003; Masui et al., 2006) and 
IMAGE (Alcamo, Leemans and Kreileman, 1998; Bouwman, Kram and Goldewijk, 2006; 
Stehfest et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, a common weakness in both simulation and optimization models comes 
from the lack of integration between the economy and the biophysical system. In principle, the 
energy-economy nexus is not well developed, assuming a simple linear positive relationship 
between them. In a nutshell, exogenous economic growth boosts energy demand, which is in turn 
supplied by a changing energy mix. At best, this linear relationship is nuanced by energy 
efficiency gains, but its positive slope normally remains unchanged. Consequently, policy-makers 
are usually advised to focus on a mere technological transition towards a renewable energy mix, 
regardless of energy demand. Moreover, to our knowledge, most conventional models assume 
high degree of energy substitutability between energy technologies and resources, implicitly 
leaving energy availability unattended. This, together with the weak integration between the 
economy and the environment, lead these models to produce stable, gradual transitions pathways.  
. In addition, the economy is usually pictured as a monolithic energy-consuming machine, 
ignoring its complex sectoral structure and highly disaggregated decision-making. Although it is 
well known that energy resources are the key factor in low-carbon transitions, plans and 
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international agreements do not usually take into consideration the aforementioned biophysical 
limits; something which could challenge their feasibility (McGlade and Ekins, 2015; Moriarty 
and Honnery, 2016; Spash, 2016; Nieto, Carpintero and Miguel, 2018). Therefore, in this paper, 
we argue that IAMs might be undervaluing the supply constraints of energy resources and the 
importance of the economic structure in low-carbon transitions. 
To check this hypothesis, we have developed a model capable of overcoming these 
limitations. This model is the economy module of a broader system dynamics model named 
MEDEAS (Capellán-Pérez et al., 2017). The feedback-rich structure of system dynamics (SD) 
allows the model to consider energy limits. The best known contribution to simulation models 
was the pioneering World3 system dynamics (SD) model of Limits to Growth (Meadows et al.,, 
1974; Meadows and Randers, 2013). Moreover, the economy module described in this article 
captures the economic structure through Input-Output analysis (IOA). Despite the existence of 
dynamic IO models, IOA has been criticised for assuming a fixed underlying technology, 
represented by the technical coefficients matrix. As the MEDEAS approach is grounded in SD 
and its scenario-based perspective, it can be adapted to a dynamic view. In addition, theoretical 
and policy-making implications for economic growth, energy availability and low-carbon 
transitions are also discussed. The article is structured as follows: section 2 sets up the theoretical 
framework of the methodology used; section 3 describes the functioning of the economic model 
developed; then, in section 4, the most relevant results are set out, according to the Business as 
usual, Green-growth and Post-growth scenarios; finally, section 5 summarises the main 
concluding remarks of the study.  
2. Theoretical framework: limits, economic structure and system 
dynamics 
The literature on sustainability transitions has been receiving increased interest from both 
scholars and policy makers consistent with the onset of the most visible impacts due to climate 
change (Markaard, Raven and Truffer, 2012). This body of literature, has been typically focused 
on sociotechnical change, innovation, agents’ interrelations at different levels and increasingly on 
the metabolic structure of societies (Geels, 2002, 2011; Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 2007; 
Haberl et al., 2011).   Sustainability transitions, as understood by the socio-metabolic approach, 
are characterised by the transformation of the current energy regime to a different one which does 
not surpass biophysical boundaries (Fischer-Kowalski, 2011). In other words, as stated by 
Raworth (2018), there is an environmental ceiling which the economy cannot breach, as well as 
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a social floor. Between these boundaries, environmental and social sustainability should meet. 
These approaches connect with the tradition of ecological economics. Interaction between the 
economy and the environment, as understood by ecological economics, points out the 
subordination of the former to the limits imposed by the latter (Daly, 1968; Costanza, 1989, 1991; 
Farley and Daly, 2003). Concretely, as stated by Georgescu-Roegen(1971), according to the first 
and second principles of thermodynamics, the economy would be subject to irreversibility. This 
means that the entropic nature of the economic process degrades the amount and quality of energy 
resources and thus that economic growth, or even the steady-state, are limited by energy 
availability. Consequently, economic models should consider these limits to achieve a better 
understanding of the economic process (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975).  
As stated before, system dynamics (SD) proves to be an adequate methodology for 
capturing these relationships, but it is also a relevant tool for economic analysis (Radzicki and 
Tauheed, 2009). Although it has typically been used by heterodox economists (Radzicki, 2009), 
it has recently even been extended to neoclassical models (Režný and Bureš, 2018). However, 
due to its features and functionalities, not assuming an a priori equilibrium, this technique has 
been much more attractive to the heterodox economists than to the neoclassical economists 
(Victor and Rosenbluth, 2007; Briens, 2015; Bernardo and D’Alessandro, 2016; Cordier et al., 
2017). System dynamics was originated in control engineering and automation to determine a 
structure with different, interrelated input and output flows to fill or drain (respectively) different 
stocks. Two variables connected by a causal link, can change in the same direction (positive 
relationship) or in opposite directions (negative relationship). In a positive –or reinforcing- 
feedback loop, the growth of the first variable causes the growth of the second variable, but also 
the growth of the second variable causes the growth of the first variable. In a traditional predator-
prey model with a lack of predators, a positive feedback loop emerges as the prey’s population 
growth lead to an increase in births, in a self-reinforcing process. This would turn the system 
unstable unless a limiting factor is applied, creating a negative feedback loop, e.g. the introduction 
of more predators in the ecosystem.   Therefore, the main advantage of SD is its capability to 
include feedbacks, which allows non-linear relationships between variables, better capturing real-
world systems.  Figure 1 shows a general simplification of the stock-flow feedback structure of 
SD. 
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Figure 1. General overview of system dynamics structure based on stock, flow and feedback. 
Source: Radzicki (2009) 
 
The traditional (and widely spread among IAMs) energy-economy nexus, pictures a 
simple, one-way relationship whereby GDP growth leads to energy use mediated by energy 
intensity (Stern, 2011; Hall and Klitgaard, 2012; Foxon, 2017). Accordingly, the greater 
economic growth desired, the more energy is required to satisfy it (linear, positive relationship). 
However, if energy limits are to be considered, a better representation would be that of Figure 2. 
GDP growth takes energy demand, which could be lowered by improving energy efficiency. In 
turn, primary energy reserves must be extracted and transformed into the final energy supply in 
order to meet this demand. As long as the energy needed to keep the GDP growing at a certain 
rate is satisfied by the energy supply, the relationship would still be positive. On the contrary, a 
restrained availability would force GDP growth down from its initial requirements. Therefore, a 
negative loop would have been established in the energy-economy nexus. In order to avoid such 
a situation, either an increase in primary energy production (extracting non-renewable energy 
resources (NRER) or installing new renewable energy source (RER) infrastructures) or a 
reduction in energy requirements (via efficiency gains or reducing GDP growth), or a combination 
of both, would be required. The first procedure alone would have to face NRER depletion and 
growing greenhouse gas emissions, as well as increasingly growth rates for the installation of 
RER infrastructures. The second procedure’s main challenge would be to achieve net reductions 
in energy requirements, in such a way that GDP growth would not offset efficiency gains; 
otherwise, GDP would decline progressively, causing socioeconomic adversity as welfare relies 
on GDP. Thus, the economic process would be tied to energy constraints within a negative loop, 
leading to a non-linear relationship. Hence, Figure 2 shows the simplified theoretical SD structure 
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of such an energy-economy feedback, whose concrete structure in our model is carefully 
explained in section 3. This forms the cornerstone of the MEDEAS-World model (Capellán-Pérez 
et al., 2017) and is, in particular, the economy module’s main contribution.  
 
Figure 2. Negative feedback loop between GDP growth and energy availability. 
Source: own elaboration. 
The relevance of SD for capturing these kinds of relationship is highlighted by the 
remarkable success of Limits to Growth (Meadows, 1972), in estimating the fundamental 
tendencies of its key variables (Bardi, 2011; Meadows and Randers, 2013). Hence, the main 
advantage of system dynamics modelling consists of its capability to capture the complexity of 
systems, path-dependency across time and feedbacks (Uehara, Nagase and Wakeland, 2013; 
Capellán-Pérez, 2016). Nevertheless, correctly specifying the energy-economy nexus is of the 
utmost importance in order to improve the significance of the outcomes (Capellán-Pérez et al., 
2015; Palmer, 2018). Despite this, there is still discussion on whether the sustainability transition 
would trigger a new era of ‘green-growth’ (Bowen and Hepburn, 2012; Kander and Stern, 2014; 
Csereklyei and Stern, 2015) or, conversely, would require a ‘post-growth’ approach involving 
degrowth or a steady-state economy (Daly, 1973; Kerschner, 2010; Jackson, 2011; Dietz and 
O’Neill, 2013; D’Alisa, Kallis and Federico, 2014; Lange, 2018).  
Should the energy-economy linkage not be considered in the model, the economy would 
implicitly not be represented as subject to biophysical constraints. At best, the model’s results 
could only be restrained to show a growing gap between energy demand and supply, suggesting 
instability for the economic system (Capellán-Pérez et al., 2015). Whereas mainstream economic 
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theories argue that disequilibrium will be corrected via prices; quantities adjustment, put forward 
by the Keynesian tradition, is a more convenient approach given the biophysical nature of the 
MEDEAS model. Nevertheless, prices are still implicit in the model, embedded in the deflated 
monetary values (see section 3.1.3). Although scholars are increasingly coping with energy limits, 
only slight absolute or relative decreases in economic output are being reported (Kiuila, 2018; 
Režný and Bureš, 2018). Furthermore, these models and others might be overestimating the 
economy’s capacity to keep growing under energy constraints. Arguably, their economic 
production supply approach, basically relying on capital and labour stock, might result in the 
partial irrelevance of energy constraints, as long as the growth in production factors offsets the 
effects of a scarcity of resources. 
Recently, ecological macroeconomic models have gone one step further, introducing 
inequality, work patterns, economic structure and even a post-growth approach (Rezai and Stagl, 
2016; Hardt and O’Neill, 2017). Supply limits are widely included, but often related to the effects 
of capital and labour supply on investment and employment, respectively. Environmental 
constraints generally appear as natural capital depletion (Bernardo and D’Alessandro, 2014; 
Fontana and Sawyer, 2016). Other research, such as that of Taylor, Rezai and Foley(2016), 
establishes that climate change would undermine investment and thus, economic growth. 
Nevertheless, it concludes that mitigation policies can stabilise climate with a cost not higher than 
1% of global GDP. Finally, models using Input-Output analysis (IOA) allow the relevance of 
economic structure in EEE interactions to be captured (James, Jansen and Opschoor, 1978; De 
Haan, 2001). A combination of system dynamics and IOA provides significant results, as in 
Briens (2015), where an Input-Output-based system dynamics model is used to impose a 
degrowth scenario through different policies. IOA offers two main advantages against other 
methodologies. First, considering complementarity instead of perfect substitution better reflects 
the real performance of the productive process (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Stern, 1997; Farley 
and Daly, 2003; D’Alessandro, Luzzati and Morroni, 2010). Second, capturing both direct and 
indirect effects of a variation in final demand on sectoral production delivers more accurate 
monetary outcomes, as well as the energy carriers of production (Leontief, 1970; Miller and Blair, 
2009). Despite the undeniable relevance of economic structure, models often forecast huge 
economic and technological transformations, maintaining it unaltered. For instance, we can 
expect different results from the current economic structure than those obtained after a transition 
where fossil fuel refineries are no longer as important as they are nowadays. For this reason, 
technical coefficients vary along time according to scenarios (see Appendix B).  
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3. Modelling a feasible world economy. Methodology 
MEDEAS-World is a global model in which the world is considered as one region within 
the IO framework, i.e. trade flows are disregarded. This global region is the result of the 
aggregation of 39 countries and a Rest of the World region (see section 3.1.3.). It is a simulation 
model, based on system dynamics (SD), built on different modules that are shown in  Figure 3 
(Capellán-Pérez et al., 2017). The validation of the models has been carried out following several 
of the usual validation procedures of models in system dynamics (Barlas, 1996; Sterman, 2000). 
Following them, “structure validity”, “extreme-condition”, “behaviour-sensitivity”, “boundary-
adequacy”, “dimensional consistency” and “behaviour-reproduction” tests have been carried out. 
Sensitivity analysis has also been applied to the variables subject to more uncertainty of the 
model. The historical data, although the available series are short, has been used for a first 
validation. Subsequently, the models have been subjected to a robustness test. Sensitivity analysis 
have been made and results compared with other models.  
Considering that the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the economy module, only 
relevant connections with it are described. Concisely, economic output requires a certain level of 
energy demand and this is compared with energy supply availability. So, the energy and the 
economy module are two-way integrated through energy demand and energy availability. Final 
energy demand is the main result of the combination of the economy and energy module’s 
operations and the most relevant link with the rest of the model. The economy module’s outputs 
are: energy demand, direct and indirect (the land use required) CO2 emissions, materials demand 
(through the demand of new energy infrastructures) and other social and environmental impacts. 
The main feedbacks to the economy module from the rest of the model, apart from exogenous 
variations described later, are delivered by the climate change impacts (CC damage function), 
(EROEI) and the energy supply availability. Figure 6 shows the simplified influences diagram of 
the economy module, illustrating the main relationship between the variables. For the sake of 
simplicity, in this paper, only energy-related feedbacks are activated. Thus, there is no influence 
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of the climate change damage function in our results. The MEDEAS-World model considers 35 
different industries (see Appendix A), as the main source for IOA is the World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD) (Dietzenbacher et al., 2013). The WIOD was selected because of its public 
data, its environmental accounts (Genty, 2012), especially regarding energy, and its socio-
economic accounts (Timmer et al., 2015). Despite the significant sectoral disaggregation, energy-
related sectors do not differentiate between energy types. For instance, sector 2 (Quarry and 
Minery) include indistinctly non-energy and energy-related materials; sector 8 (Coke oven, 
Refined petroleum and Nuclear fuel) as well as sector 17 (Electricity, Gas and Water supply) 
include several final energy use types. All sectors have been taken as energy-demanding including 
the energy-related ones and therefore, energy supply is estimated in the energy module according 
to the final energy requirements of all sectors. All the same can be applied to materials.  
 
 
Figure 3- MEDEAS-World model schematic overview. Source: (Capellán-Pérez et al., 2017) 
 
Before going into the economy module’s particulars, it is worth giving an overall view of 
how the whole MEDEAS world model functions. The different module functionalities are the 
following (see in brackets the corresponding section in Capellán-Perez et al. (2017) where further 
information can be found):  
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1. Economy (IOT) & Population (Economy module): through hybrid (i.e. 
combining monetary and physical units, see sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4) Input-Output 
Analysis, the final energy demand by industries and the final end-use energy carriers are 
estimated. Subsequently, it will be referred as final energy demand and supply when not 
mentioning different end-use energy carriers [section 2.2 in Capellán-Perez et al. (2017)] 
2. Energy (NR & RER availability) (Energy module):  this includes the renewable 
(RER) and non-renewable energy (NRER) resource potentials and availability, taking 
into account biophysical and temporal constraints. In total, 5 final end-use energy carriers 
are considered (electricity, heat, solids, gases and liquids) and a diversity of energy 
technologies are modelled. The energy module provides the net final energy supply 
which, in turn, constrains the final energy use by the economy. This energy-economy 
feedback is not often taken into consideration in the literature, which could lead models 
to unfeasible results. [section 2.3 in Capellán-Perez et al. (2017)] 
3. Energy infrastructures module: this estimates the infrastructure deployment of 
power plants to generate electricity and heat.  [section 2.3 in Capellán-Pérez et al. (2017)] 
4. Materials module: materials required by the economy, and especially for the 
construction of energy infrastructures, are tracked by MEDEAS. [section 2.4 in Capellán-
Pérez et al. (2017)] 
5. Climate module: this projects the GHG emissions of the system, which could also 
be fed back through a damage function. However, as mentioned above, this feedback has 
been deactivated for the purpose of this work and is shown in grey in Figure 3. [section 
2.5 in Capellán-Pérez et al. (2017)] 
6. Land use module:  land-use requirements of the RER are accounted in the land-
use module. [section 2.6 in Capellán-Pérez et al. (2017)] 
7. Social and environmental impacts indicators: this module collects the main 
outcomes regarding impacts in these two areas. [section 2.7 in Capellán-Pérez et al. 
(2017)]  
3.1. The economy module 
The MEDEAS-World economy module’s general structure could be summarised in a 
sequential way as shown in Figure 4; whereas a more detailed, simplified influence diagram can 
be seen in Figure 6. Likewise, Appendix D shows the system dynamics structure of the model in 
several views, as depicted in the software employed. The economy module is sectorally 
disaggregated by 35 industries (see Appendix A), is demand-driven and subject to energy 
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feedbacks. Basically, exogenous final demand growth is imposed by scenarios regarding 
population and GDP per capita growth. Then, along with income share scenarios, the adequate 
inputs are delivered to feed the sectoral final demand function, which distributes this growth 
amongst industries. Once the variation of the sectoral final demand is known, Input-Output 
Analysis (IOA) obtains the output required by each industry to satisfy it. As energy is needed to 
produce economic output, energy coefficients (namely, sectoral final energy intensities) permit 
the model to obtain the final energy required (by energy source) to produce the sectoral output. 
Both final energy intensities and economic structure, represented by the A matrix (see section 
3.1.3), evolve during the simulation period according to their historical trends and scenario 
assumptions. Depending on the final energy of each type needed for the economy to grow at a 
predetermined rate, the energy module (influenced by the others) computes ways to deliver. 
Primary energy must be extracted and transformed, new infrastructures might have to be 
deployed, and materials must be extracted and processed to fulfil this commitment. Therefore, 
taking into account NRER depletion curves, EROEI, RER potential and growing installed 
capacity, the energy module delivers the final energy availability. After that, final energy demand 
and final energy supply are compared, providing the model with the feasible production and, in 
turn, feasible final demand, by inversely applying IOA. Therefore, although energy and economic 
demand begin the simulation as being completely exogenous, they become endogenous as soon 
as energy scarcity appears. 
Figure 4. Economy module structure and main energy inputs. Source: own elaboration. 
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3.1.1. Primary Income 
As mentioned before, the economy module is demand-driven. An exogenous final 
demand variation via Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) is forced into the system 
regarding past trends and scenario storylines. Given that population growth is also determined 
exogenously, total expected GDP growth is easily calculated by multiplying GDPpc and 
population. Labour and capital compensation (wages and gross profits respectively), i.e. primary 
income, is estimated by the model because it is the main input to final demand functions –in 
households’ consumption and gross fixed capital formation-, as described in section 3.1.2. For 
this reason, primary income share (the proportion represented by each primary income category 
over GDP) scenarios have been established according to their characteristics (see section 4). Then, 
labour and capital compensation is obtained by multiplying GDP by these exogenous income 
shares. Let 𝑙𝑎𝑏 and 𝑐𝑎𝑝 be labour and capital compensation respectively. Then, αlab =
lab
GDP
 and 
αcap =
cap
GDP
  stand for each primary  income share . They gradually evolve from their initial 
observed value until they reach each scenario target value. Therefore, by multiplying GDP by 
αlab and αcap , we obtain the primary income lab and cap. Hereafter, primary income distribution 
–that will be noted indistinctly as income distribution- operates as an input for sectoral final 
demand functions.  
3.1.2. Final demand 
After the previously explained economy-wide variation in final demand is estimated, final 
demand is distributed among industries. For this purpose, a sectoral final demand function has 
been estimated by institutional sectors running panel data regressions, taking income as the main 
explanatory variable. All regressions are corrected for autocorrelation, heterokedasticity and 
contemporary correlation depending on the case, while Eq. 1 defines the components of the 
sectoral final demand function:  
𝐟𝐝 = 𝐜 + 𝐠𝐟𝐜𝐟 + 𝐠𝐞 + 𝐢𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐭 Eq. 1 
Where fd is the 35x1 vector of final demand formed by its vector components such as c, 
thehouseholds and non-profit organisations serving household consumption, 𝐠𝐟𝐜𝐟 is gross fixed 
capital formation, 𝐠𝐞 is government expenditure and invent is changes in inventories and 
valuables. Following the conditions imposed by the database used, gfcf measures the investments 
made by each institutional sector in durable products produced by industry ‘i'. For this reason, 
considering that almost half of investments are concentrated in the construction sector and the 
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significant weight of households in construction investment, gfcf_18 (i.e. gross fixed capital 
formation in the construction sector, number 18 in Appendix A) has been modelled separately 
due to its particularities (a high proportion of households’ investment). Likewise, ge is relatively 
autonomous or, at best, inversely linked to the economic cycle. Even in this case, nothing can 
ensure that ge will perform in this way, as it basically depends on policy choices. Because of this, 
ge by industries is exogenously considered the proportion of each industry’s final demand –e.g. 
66% in Education or 4.5% in Inland transport- of the last available historical observation. The 
same approach has been followed to include invent because of its residual weight in total final 
demand. Eq. 2-Eq. 4 collect the main structure of each sectoral final demand disregarding vector 
notation (see Details in Appendix A).  
ln(𝑐) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽2 ln(𝐿𝑎𝑏)                    i ∈ 1…35 Eq. 2 
ln (𝑔𝑓𝑐𝑓) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽2ln (𝐶𝑎𝑝)           i ∈ 1…17 ∩ 19…35 Eq. 3 
ln (𝑔𝑓𝑐𝑓_18) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln (𝐿𝑎𝑏) + 𝛽2ln (𝐶𝑎𝑝).     Eq. 4 
where 𝛽0 is the intercept of each function, 𝛽1𝑖 is the sectoral intercept that captures the 
structural effects of sectoral distribution in panel data regressions, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑖 is a dichotomous variable 
with value 1 when forecasting the actual sector and 0 otherwise. 𝐿𝑎𝑏 stands for labour 
compensation (wages) and 𝐶𝑎𝑝 for capital compensation (gross profits), while 𝛽2stands for the 
coefficients multiplying the explanatory variables. Subscript i indicates the different industries. 
Although the literature usually takes interest rates as an explanatory variable, there are difficulties 
to estimate a global interest rate, which leads us not to include it in our world model. The literature 
also suggests that the effects of real interest rates differ radically between regions (Hein and 
Ochsen, 2003); are not clear (Lavoie, 1995, 2014); or are even non-significant (Stockhammer, 
Onaran and Ederer, 2009). All the institutional sectors’ final demand rely on income: con wages, 
gfcf on gross profits and 𝑔𝑓𝑐𝑓_18 on both primary income components, given the 
abovementioned particularities. Therefore, sectoral final demand is a function of economic 
structure and income.  
3.1.3. Input-Output Analysis 
Once the first economy-wide variation in final demand is distributed among the 35 
industries, Input-Output Analysis allows the production required to satisfy each industry’s 
demand (Miller and Blair, 2009) to be calculated. The WIOD database includes 41countries 
(including OECD countries, other major economies and a Rest of the World region) containing 
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the whole world economy. Nonetheless, because MEDEAS takes the world as one economy with 
no international trade, all countries have been collapsed into just one. Furthermore, original IOT 
series in previous year prices have been translated into a World IOT in chained, linked volumes 
with a mobile base year.  
 
Figure 5. From interregional Input-Output tables (IOT) to a World IOT. 
Regional disaggregation. 𝑧1,𝑛: intermediate consumption from region 1 to region n; 𝑓𝑑1,𝑛: final demand of products 
and services from region 1 made by region n; 𝑥𝑛: production in region n; 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑛: gross value added in region n. Sectoral 
disaggregation: represented in the One Region IOT. 𝑧𝑖,𝑗 refers the sales from sector ‘i’ (rows) purchased by sector ‘j’ 
(columns). Gross Value Added is measured by columns ‘j’ and 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 representing that all the production  responds 
to demand requirements (demand not satisfied is measured as Changes in inventories).  
Source: own elaboration 
Figure 5 indicates  that intermediate consumption are the trade flows between sectors that 
simultaneously behave as sellers (subscript ‘i’ in rows) and purchasers (subscript ‘j’ in columns) 
(𝑧𝑖𝑗). This delivers a squared matrix with 35 different industries (see Appendix A). Total Gross 
Value Added (GVA) equals total Final Demand (fd), and therefore total GDP. Production can be 
measured demand-side as the sales of sector ‘i’ plus the final demand of products and services 
from sector ‘i’ or supply-side as the sum of total intermediate products purchases of sector ‘j’ 
from the rest of sectors ‘i’ plus the GVA (lab and cap) generated in this sector ‘j’. This supply-
side view is crucial to understand the structural relationships between industries, i.e., the amount 
of inputs from each industry needed by others to produce 1 unit of product. Thus, technical 
coefficients measure the fixed complementary relationship between inputs and outputs according 
to Eq. 5: 
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𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑗
         i,j ∈ 1…35 Eq. 5 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is the technical coefficient of sector i over sector j. Let us denote A as the 
squared technical coefficients matrix including all 𝑎𝑖𝑗 and Z the squared matrix of intermediate 
consumption including all 𝑧𝑖𝑗. Finally ?̂? is the diagonal matrix of sectoral production. Hence, in 
matrix notation, A=[𝑎𝑖𝑗] =Z?̂?
−1 and thus Z=A?̂?. As said before, from a demand point of view, 
production is the sum of intermediate consumption and final demand. In matrix notation x= 𝑍 +
𝑓𝑑  being ‘x’ the column vector of sectoral production and ‘fd’ the final demand vector, therefore. 
x=A•x+fd  Eq. 6 
x= = (𝐈 − 𝐀)−1 • 𝒇𝒅 Eq. 7 
            𝐱 = 𝐋 • 𝐟𝐝 Eq. 8 
where (𝐈 − 𝐀)−1 = 𝐋 = [𝑙ij]  is the so-called Leontief inverse, reflecting the elasticity of 
production (𝐱) to changes in final demand (𝐟𝐝). In other words, it measures how production reacts 
to satisfy a variation in final demand, so sectoral production is obtained through IOA in 
MEDEAS. Considering that static technical coefficients would not be a reasonable assumption 
for such a long simulation period encompassing structural change, the A Matrix evolves according 
to tendencies and scenarios. The evolution of the A matrix is set to begin by 2020 and to finish as 
soon as either the consistency condition is met1, or the simulation period reaches 2050. Table 2 
shows each scenario assumption and Appendix B shows the different target matrices towards 
which the original A matrix evolves. 
3.1.4. Energy-Economy Feedback 
Most EEE models take economic growth as given within a certain exogenous growth rate, 
which also drives energy demand. Therefore, economic and energy demand show a positive slope, 
occasionally nuanced by efficiency gains in the case of energy (a kind of relative decoupling 
between them). In addition, energy demand is always met by energy supply and the only problem 
to be solved is the energy mix which defines the said supply. In the MEDEAS world model, the 
economy receives a feedback from the energy system so, if the energy supply is not enough to 
meet the demand, economic output must be reduced. It is important to recall that, although energy 
                                                     
1 According to Input-Output Table accounting balances, the column sum of technical coefficients 
(µ) must be lower than 1, where (1- µ) is the share of value added in sectoral production. Given that certain 
sectoral structural coherence must be maintained, each sector’s technical coefficients stop evolving as soon 
as (1- µ) becomes one third of its original value.  
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stock (reserves for NRER and energy potentials for RER) naturally determines its feasible 
amount, it is the energy supply flow and not the stock which has to match the final energy demand 
flow for each period. This means that the extraction, processing and distribution for NRER and 
infrastructure deployment, as well as the generation and distribution for RER, are the activities 
that deliver the final energy supply flow. This means that energy scarcity can surge, even if energy 
reserves and potentials are still available to transform into final energy (see Figure 2). Because 
this flow is determined by the energy infrastructures deployed in past periods, the system’s 
capability to fully satisfy the economy’s demand is path-dependent. 
In the previous section, how the production required to satisfy demand by sectors was 
calculated. After that the hybrid Input-Output analysis with energy intensities (e) as the energy 
coefficients is conducted. Being 𝐟𝐞?̂?𝒌𝒋=[𝐟𝐞𝐝𝐤𝐣] the 35x35 diagonal matrix of final energy demand 
by 5 final end-use energy carriers ‘k’ and 35 sectors ‘j’ , the 175x175 diagonal matrix of total 
final energy demand (𝐟𝐞?̂?) is 
𝐟𝐞?̂? =[
𝐟𝐞?̂?𝟏𝟏 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 ⋱ 𝟎
𝟎 𝟎 𝐟𝐞?̂?𝐤𝐣
]; k ∈ 1,…,5; j ∈ 1,…,35. 
 The same structure could be applied to energy intensities, so we have the ?̂?𝐤𝐣 diagonal 
matrix of diagonal matrices of each sectoral final end-use energy carrier. Then, ?̂?−1is the diagonal 
matrix of sectoral production , according to Eqs. 9-10: 
  ?̂?𝐤𝐣 = 𝐟𝐞?̂?𝐤𝐣 •  ?̂?−1 =
(
 
 
𝑓𝑒𝑑11
𝑥1
0 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 0
𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑘𝑗
𝑥𝑗 )
 
 
= (
𝑒11 0 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 0 𝑒𝑘𝑗
)     
 
Eq. 9 
 
𝐟𝐞𝐝𝐤𝐣 = ?̂?𝐤𝐣 • 𝐱 + 𝐡𝐡_?̂?𝐤𝐣 • 𝐜 = ?̂?𝐤𝐣 • 𝐋 • 𝐟𝐝 + 𝐡𝐡_?̂?𝐤𝐣 • 𝐜   Eq. 10 
Thus, the module uses an identity (Eq. 9) to estimate the final energy demand by sector j 
and source k (𝐟𝐞𝐝𝐤𝐣). The final energy demand would be the result (Eq.10) of multiplying sectoral 
energy intensities (?̂?𝐤𝐣) by production (𝐱 = 𝐋 • 𝐟𝐝) plus the 35x35 households energy intensities 
by resource and sector diagonal matrix (𝐡𝐡_?̂?𝐤𝐣) multiplied by households’ consumption (𝐜). 
Appendix C describes how to estimate separately the direct and indirect effects of the final energy 
demand, which do not correspond to the two different components in Eq.10. Then, the model 
checks whether the total energy demand by resource (tfed=[𝑡𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑘] = ∑ 𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑘𝑗
35
j=1 ) is higher or 
lower than the final energy supply by end-use carrier (𝐭𝐟𝐞𝐬 = [𝑡𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑘]). Consequently, Eq. 11 
shows how feasible energy demand (𝐟_𝐟𝐞𝐝𝐤𝐣) is calculated: 
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 𝐟_𝐟𝐞𝐝𝐤𝐣 = 𝐟𝐞𝐝𝐤𝐣 • ε;   ε = Min (1,
𝐭𝐟𝐞𝐬
𝐭𝐟𝐞𝐝
) .        0 < 𝜀 > 1      Eq. 11 
with 𝜀 as a shortage coefficient valued as being 1 when tfes ≥ tfed , and thus no energy 
constraints, and the quotient between them otherwise. As there is no assumption of perfect 
substitutability in either economic or energy inputs, the type of energy which is lacking in a higher 
proportion (i.e., the minimum quotient in Eq.11) determines the shortage coefficient. Moreover, 
for the sake of simplicity, it has been considered that economic output decreases proportionally 
amongst industries in the case that shortages appear. Thus, feasible sectoral energy demand 
imposes a new sectoral feasible output which, by taking it instead of the required output, and 
rearranging Eq. 10, we have:  
  𝐟_𝐱 = 𝐞−1 • 𝐟_𝐟𝐞𝐝𝐤𝐣 
Eq. 12 
Finally, introducing Eq. 11 into Eq. 12: 
𝐟_𝐱 = 𝐞−1  • 𝐟𝐞𝐝𝐤𝐣 •  Min (1,
𝐭𝐟𝐞𝐬
𝐭𝐟𝐞𝐝
)   
 
 
Eq. 13 
Therefore, economic output is a function of energy intensity (negative effect), energy 
demand and energy supply when 𝐭𝐟𝐞𝐬 < 𝐭𝐟𝐞𝐝. Moreover, considering that energy demand stands 
for Eq. 10, the economic output would also, indirectly, be a function of economic structure and 
final demand. Lastly, conducting an inverse IOA, final demand satisfied by feasible output is 
obtained –solving Eq. 7 for fd instead of x- delivering the feasible final demand.  
Energy constraints do not have to be seen as a literal shortage, such as, for instance, 
gasoline running out in petrol stations. Conversely, as long as it takes energy to produce economic 
output, it should be seen as limiting the economy’s maximum potential.  Considering this 
outcome, as total final demand equals total GDP in the world economy, income in the subsequent 
years is obtained by multiplying this figure by labour and capital shares. Hence, income becomes 
endogenous as soon as energy scarcity appears. This approach raises the question of economic 
growth feasibility under biophysical (energy) constraints. Regarding the importance of energy 
supply to determine economic output, a brief overview of the energy module is provided below. 
In order to evaluate how sensitive the results are to this energy-economy feedback, it can be 
deactivated by disregarding geological limits. 
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3.2. Energy Module 
Energy availability is the main output of the Energy module; it is the core, most developed 
and complex module in MEDEAS. In order to fully understand its internal rationale and concrete 
mechanisms, it would be advisable to see the model’s technical report (Capellán-Pérez et al., 
2017), where it is thoroughly described in section 2.3. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, the 
essentials for understanding its relationships with the Economy module are briefly noted. 
Basically, the Economy module demands a certain volume of each final end-use energy carrier 
from the energy system, which in turn delivers the energy available to satisfy it.  
The main processes which take place in the Energy module refer to the installed capacity 
of renewable energy, the availability of non-renewable energy resources, the energy efficiency 
gains and the EROEI. Basically, RER installed capacity and NRE availability are estimated 
according to different scenarios based on literature, and regarding different technologies and 
primary resources, respectively. The literature used for this purpose is shown in Table 2 in section 
4. The maximum extraction curves impose a limit to yearly NRER extraction, which 
endogenously evolve in a path-dependent way since they are bounded to the extraction in 
precedent years and therefore, to final energy demand. Moreover, given the high uncertainty 
involving the extraction curves, the ‘Middle’ and ‘Best Guess’ options have been selected in order 
to avoid extreme, unrealistic outcomes. In fact, the results shown in this article compare the 
situation regarding and disregarding energy limits. More information and a thorough literature 
review on depletion curves can be found in section 2.3.3 in Capellán-Pérez et al. (2017).   
The selection of renewable energies starts from the historical evolution data and 
establishes the maximum values of annual growth. These values can be modified by the user of 
the model. Demand drives the development of new infrastructures (power plants). The 
distribution of the power plants among the different options is currently chosen based on the 
EROEI, and taking into account other restrictions. The choice of EROEI as a criterion is based 
on the need to optimize the total consumption of energy in a scenario of limited energy resources. 
Section 2.4.5. in Capellán-Pérez et al. (2017) provides more insights on this. Also, de Castro et 
al. (2019) discusses further on that, as well as on the role of EROEI in MEDEAS model.  
Moreover, given the inertia and rigidities in the productive processes highly dependent 
on natural resources, adjustments are typically produced with quantity changes (instead of prices, 
i.e. costs), as post-Keynesian approaches have highlighted (Lavoie, 2014). Sectoral final energy 
intensities have been estimated for each scenario as well, with particular regard to the transport 
sectors. Finally, as long as the system transits to a different energy mix, the higher (lesser) EROEI 
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provided by the actual technologies and resources, the lesser (higher) installed capacity will be 
required to satisfy the same amount of energy demand (i.e., if EROEI declines, an additional 1% 
of energy demand would take more than an additional 1% of energy capacity installed).  
4. Low-carbon economies coping with the limits. Results. 
The transition towards low-carbon economies needs the implementation of policies, time 
to fully deploy them, and an economic system to support them. The combination of these elements 
shapes different scenarios for the most likely future landscape. The most relevant results from 
scenarios, in terms of climate and economic policy, can be represented by emissions and GDP 
growth (see section 4.1), as described below. Furthermore, economic structural change is 
evaluated in section 4.2. In this article, we have considered three different scenarios, following 
specific storylines and the extended simulation period until 2050. The Business as Usual (BAU) 
scenario basically provides the model with inputs based on current trends and no further policies 
to meet climate goals.  
 
Conversely, the Green Growth (GG) scenario storyline states the deployment of a 
technology-based set of policies aimed at achieving the climate goals (i.e., the 2ºC Paris 
Agreement objective) boosted by economic growth (Bowen and Hepburn, 2012; Kander and 
Stern, 2014; Csereklyei and Stern, 2015). According to the key assumptions in the different 
‘scenarios families’ given by van Vuuren et al. (2012), this scenario would be consistent with the 
SSP1 narrative. This implies relatively low population growth rates, high economic expectation 
(Expected GDPpc growth), high increase in energy efficiency and transition policies towards a 
renewable energy mix. Higher GDPpc growth rates are grounded on high development 
expectations for the Low and Medium Income countries and medium expectations for the High 
Income Countries.  Since the Paris Agreement can be described as following a green growth 
approach (Nieto et al., 2018; Spash, 2016), its policies could be considered the foundation of this 
scenario. These policies can be summarised as a common objective to electrify the economy, 
being complemented by a general switch to RER in the electricity energy mix, although including 
nuclear energy. In addition, policies are aimed at fostering bioenergy and energy efficiency gains, 
especially in the transport sector. Finally, the general spirit of the policies aims to achieve all these 
goals with a so-called ‘inclusive economic growth’. 
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Figure 6. Simplified influence diagram of the Economy module. 
Source: own elaboration.  Red arrows imply negative relationship between variables; Blue arrows  a positive relationship.
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According to this, inequality would increase across and within countries, so income 
distribution in this scenarios tends to increase the labour share. The more or less explicit objective 
is to undertake a modernisation process widely based on the path previously followed by 
developed countries, but including a technology-based transition to RER. Because of this, the A 
matrix, as a representation of the underlying technological structure, smoothly evolves towards 
Denmark’s figures, as a developed European country highly committed to sustainability.  
Lastly, we propose a third Post-Growth (PG) scenario. There is no explicit consensus on 
what a Post-Growth scenario means on the literature, but a well-known set of policies can be 
identified in ecological macroeconomics models (Hardt and O’Neil, 2017) as well as some 
assumptions that can be linked to a ‘Regional Sustainable Development’ narrative (van Vuuren 
et al., 2012). Because GDP growth is ruled out as the most important policy objective, economic 
growth slowly declines whereas other policy objectives are being pursued. This way, medium 
population growth along with the possibility of rapid technoligical change and proactive 
environmental protection, as well as a reduction of income inequality are applied to this scenario. 
Therefore, we implement a planned degrowth in the GDPpc targets, and income distribution leans 
towards labour compensation more than in GG.  Likewise, the economic structure (represented 
by the A Matrix) changes favouring (penalising) the less (most) energy intensive sectors (see 
Appendix A and section 4.2). This approach is based on the procedures used by Leontief and 
Duchin (1986), whereby expected reductions or increases in relative demand for sectoral 
productive processes are represented by changing A matrix rows (i.e., sales proportion over each 
sector’s output). Regarding energy, the figures are comparable to those in the GG scenario, but 
with reduced bioenergy growth to reduce competition pressures with other land uses and the 
phasing-out of nuclear energy in order to reduce as much as possible the NRER requirements.  
Assumptions regarding RER energy potentials and NRER depletion curves have been 
made for all the scenarios. The most relevant exogenous inputs regarding these scenarios are 
summarised in Table 1. The main results, according to these scenarios, are shown thereafter.  
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Variable 
Business 
as Usual 
Green 
Growth 
Post-
Growth 
All scenarios 
SOCIOECONOMIC 
GDP pc growth * 1.42 % 2.55 % -0.67 % 
 
Population growth *  0.72 % 0.61 % 0.76 % 
Target labour share (2050) 52 % 60 % 65 % 
Target A matrix (2050) ** 
Historical 
evolution 
2009 
Denmark 
IOT 
Non 
energy-
intensive 
Phase-out oil for electricity 
and heat? 
No Yes Yes 
Energy efficiency gains (max. 
yearly growth) 
1% 1.5% 1.5% 
Afforestation programme? No  Yes Yes 
Nuclear installed capacity Constant Growth Phase-out 
ENERGY Annual growth 
Maximum 
energy 
potentials 
References 
Electrical RER 
capacity 
installed 
growth 
Hydro 2.8 % 5.6 % 5.6 % 1 TWe 
(de Castro et 
al., 2011, 
2013, 2014)   
Geot 2.4 % 4.8 % 4.8 % 0.3 TWth 
Bio 7.2 % 14.4 % 14.4 %  
Oceanic 4.8 % 20.0 % 20.0 % 0.05 TWe 
Wind 
O
n 
s
h
or 
e 
25.1 % 30.0 % 30.0 % 1 TWe 
O
ff 
s
h
or 
e 
41.0 % 41.0 % 41.0 % 0.25 TWe 
Solar PV 35.0 %  35.0 % 35.0 %  
Bioenergy 
2nd Gen 11.0 %  20.0 %  15.0 %  0.95 TW 
3rd Gen 
(starting 
2025) 
11.0 % 20.0 % 15.0 % 0.95 TW 
Residues 11.0 % 20.0 % 20.0 % 0.79 TW 
Biogas 15.0 % 20.0 % 20.0 % 0,16 TW 
NRER 
depletion 
curves 
Oil ‘Middle’ (Laherrère, 2006) 
Gas ‘Best Guess’ (Laherrère, 2010) 
Coal Best Guess (Mohr et al., 2015) 
Uranium (Zittel and Schindler, 2006) 
Table 1. Overview of the most relevant scenario inputs. Source: own elaboration.  
* Simulation period average value.   
** See Appendix B.  
Although the scenario design is partially based on qualitative assumptions from the 
literature (O’Neill et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017), the BAU can be summarised as a projection of 
current trends and Post-growth as a scenario not often considered in the literature; while Green 
Growth is the most akin to its homologous version in the literature (i.e., SSP2 from IPCC).  
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4.1. Emissions and GDP growth under energy constraints 
The variation in emissions has been estimated up to 2030 and 2050, as the former is the 
reference year for the Paris Agreement and the latter is the reference year for the IPCC reports. 
The base year is the average emissions from 2005-2015, since the Paris Agreement commitments 
(more than 160 INDCs) vary their base year within the mentioned range. Moreover, in order to 
evaluate the relevance of including energy limits, results have been assessed both considering 
(labelled as ‘Limits’ in graphs) and disregarding energy limits (labelled as ‘No limits’). The 
difference between both assumptions is operated by activating or deactivating geological limits. 
Figure 7 shows emission outcomes by scenarios. Firstly, it does not matter whether we assume 
energy limits or not in the no policies scenario (BAU), as it dramatically fails to achieve climate 
goals. In this respect, the green growth scenario (GG) outcomes are substantially different if we 
activate the energy-economy feedback, i.e. geological limits are enabled, at least by 2050. Should 
the economy be able to take as much energy as needed regardless of its availability, emissions 
would even change their sign as compared to the same scenario when the energy-economy 
feedback is considered. There are no evident differences by 2030 (≈+14%), as no significant 
energy shortages appear until afterwards that date. However, by 2050, if the economy finds no 
obstacles in its consumption of as much energy as required to grow at a certain rate, emissions 
would rise by 51%. 
 As stated in Eq.10, energy demand depends upon GDP growth, energy intensities (both 
sectoral and household) and economic structure (represented by the Leontief matrix). Whereas  
energy intensities and the economic structure are increasingly efficient2 reducing the restraining 
effect of energy the higher GDP growth (see Table 2)expands final energy demand, eventually 
offsetting the efficiency gains and leading to energy scarcity as well.  As a consequence, GDP 
growth is also hampered, although later than in BAU (Figure 8). On account of this rebound effect 
in the GG scenario, the energy system needs to draw on NRER for a longer period, even 
considering the high rate at which RER infrastructures are deployed (see Table 2). Conversely, 
as soon as energy limits are taken into account, results vary substantially. As can be seen in Figure 
7, emissions fall by around 16%, although still far from meeting IPCC goals to avoid a 2ºC 
increase (-41% to -72%).  Contrary to the previous case, the final energy demand is not always 
satisfied, resulting in lower energy consumption and hence lower emissions. In addition to NRER 
exhaustion, as RER infrastructures gain momentum in the energy mix, the system’s EROEI 
                                                     
2 Producing the same amount of economic output allows a higher value added (GDP) to be 
obtained or, conversely: in order to obtain the same GDP, less production is required. See Appendix B 
(Target matrices). 
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declines. Subsequently, a higher installed capacity for the same energy demand is required (see 
section 3.1.3.1). To sum up, a relatively high GDP growth forces energy demand up, offsetting 
efficiency gains and a more efficient economic structure. Because the final energy supply flow is 
not able to meet the final energy demand, energy consumption is lower, leading to better climate 
outcomes. In other words, emissions are reduced at the cost of depleting energy resources.  
 
Figure 7. Emissions change by scenarios. From 2005-2015 mean to 2030 and 2050. 
Note: GG: Green Growth scenario; PG: Post-Growth scenario; BAU: Business as Usual scenario.  
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of MEDEAS World results. 
Alternatively, the post-growth (PG) scenario remains entirely below the 2ºC threshold in 
both cases (≈-57%). As verified by the GG scenario, a huge drop in energy intensities and a more 
efficient economic structure is not enough to downsize final energy demand. To overcome this 
hurdle, the PG scenario drops energy intensities just the same, but estimates a different, more 
efficient A matrix and a declining GDP growth (see Table 2 and Appendix B for Target matrices). 
To summarise, different outcomes amongst scenarios, especially between the GG and PG 
scenarios and the no policy scenario (BAU), are widely explained by the RER increase in the 
energy mix and the phasing-out of petroleum for heat and electricity. However, differences 
between GG and PG are mostly socioeconomic, reflected by different economic growth efforts, 
sectoral economic structures and functional income distribution.  
Figure 8 shows the different outcomes for GDP growth regarding the figures in Table 1. 
The darker lines show exogenous GDP growth scenarios, i.e., disregarding the energy-economy 
feedback (‘No Limits’) and the lighter ones the results once the energy-economy feedback is 
activated (‘Limits’). MEDEAS follows a metabolic approach whereby biophysical requirements 
are needed for throughput.  Therefore, if higher energy supply is required for the expected GDP 
growth rate, then the economy will be able to grow lower than expected. As a consequence, in the 
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absence of any further energy transition policies (BAU), the economy might stagnate within the 
next decade and start a sustained downsizing afterwards. As there is no phasing-out of oil for heat 
and electricity, the liquid energy potential could fail to meet the economic system’s demand even 
at an early stage, leading to the collapse of economic output. Since there are no policies aimed at 
actively improving energy efficiency or changing the energy mix, economic growth is not able to 
recover during the simulation, as it faces subsequent resources scarcities –specially solids (coal)- 
after the initial liquids shortage. 
 
Figure 8. GDP growth scenarios (3-yr mobile average). 
Source: own elaboration on the basis of MEDEAS World results. 
Furthermore, should the Paris Agreement policies be undertaken (GG scenario) within 
the next decades, economic growth would be compatible with a rapid energy transition, at least 
until the mid-2030s. There is a solids shortage which hinders economic growth from maintaining 
its trend, although still not enough to stop increasing output. In other words, the economic activity 
will demand such an amount of final energy provided by liquids that the energy system will not 
be able to deliver. Thus, if the total output cannot be produced, the final demand is not fully 
satisfied, undermining GDP growth. By the end of the simulation period, GDP growth seems to 
be recovering. What this means is that once energy scarcity begins to determine the potential 
economic output, the constraint can be more or less severe regarding the shortage coefficient. 
Nevertheless, both BAU and GG trends lead, at the very least, to a slow-growth regime in the 
next few decades to come. 
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What MEDEAS captures is not a sudden or dramatic energy crisis such as the 70’s oil 
crisis, driven by geopolitical and institutional reasons. Rather, a lack of energy supply is posing a 
decline in the economy’s capacity to increase throughput that might hinder economic growth and 
drive the global economy to stagnation. In the low-carbon transition, time matters and this is 
captured by MEDEAS. It takes energy to deploy the renewable energy infrastructures and at the 
earlier stage this will need to be carried out with a high proportion of NRER in what has been 
called the ‘energy trap’ (Sers and Victor, 2018) or, put it in other words, the ‘Sower’s way’ 
referred to net energy availability (Sgouridis, Csala and Bardi, 2016). Certainly, the geographic 
coexistence of different metabolic regimes could strengthen this tendency. In fact, not by chance 
the Paris Agreement only imposes a carbon reduction to the High Income countries and allows 
huge carbon increases in the lower income countries. The use of NRER will potentially remain 
an important share of the energy mix in the years to come, especially in Middle Income countries. 
Given the increasing cost (both in energy and economic terms) of their extraction due to the 
reduction in the accessibility of the better resources, the development process of the so-called 
‘emergent countries’ could be hampered and might potentially lead to geostrategic conflicts.  
In this context of a slowing GDP growth, a trend that can even be noticed by just taking 
the historical data, the PG scenario implies an adaptive approach which attains climate goals.  The 
downsizing of economic growth is conducted in a steady way, with neither considerable 
fluctuations, nor abrupt collapses, whereas income distribution is improved. Essentially, whilst 
GG scenarios have to face involuntary economic downsizing and energy source depletion just to 
achieve an insufficient emissions reduction, the PG scenario widely meets climate goals without 
facing the huge cost of non-planned, disruptive, plummeting economic output. Moreover, an 
economic system which pushes NRER reserves down less allows the whole system to retain a 
larger amount of these resources underground. In this context, policies aimed at maintaining 
welfare, or increasing it in the case of developing countries, would be of the utmost important if 
the energy transition is to be completed on a fair and equal basis. For this purpose, it is 
fundamental a decoupling between welfare and economic growth. A new set of Post-Growth 
policies could be useful to achieve socioeconomic goals along with the climate targets.  We 
explore further on that in section 5.  
As long as energy feedbacks are not included in models, their outcomes might be flawed, 
suggesting that economic output could be increased without limits. Standard production 
functions, even if considering energy (or, more generally, natural resources) as a production 
factor, could at best capture relative reductions on its positive slope. On the one hand, the 
assumption of perfect substitutability of production factors allows conventional models to 
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counterbalance energy constraints by adding more of the other inputs (namely, capital and labour). 
On the other hand, by considering natural resources (natural capital) as one more input, their 
depletion (depreciation) can theoretically be corrected by new investment, omitting the 
irreversibility of environmental impacts. System dynamics and its stock and flow, feedback-rich 
structure allow the model to capture energy boundaries that the economy cannot surpass. Once 
energy constraints are integrated into the model, the results show that climate goals could only be 
met by keeping economic growth as a policy objective at a high socioeconomic cost (output 
collapse) and the depletion of NRER. What this suggests is a growth-mitigation paradox, where 
the only reason why climate goals are barely met in the GG scenario is because an economic 
collapse occurs during the simulation period. What this result might suggest is that most Energy-
Economy-Environment models could be inaccurately specifying energy-economy interactions.  
Nonetheless, when scarcity becomes significant (𝜀 ≅ 0.98 or lower), the liquids scarcity 
stands out above the other resources. The NRER extraction rate is no longer high enough to meet 
the economic growth rates the world is used to, or those that the so-called non-developed countries 
would require to follow the development pathways previously undertaken by rich countries. What 
is more, high economic growth might not even be a feasible option for the future, regardless of 
whether the energy transition is completed or not. Furthermore, as long as climate impacts are 
disregarded in this analysis, the GDP outcomes could be expected to be worsened in the scenarios 
with higher GHG emissions.  
4.2. Structural change and the uncertain pathways towards sustainability 
The economic structure is a key issue in sustainability transitions. The economic system 
consists of several sub-economies, each of them with their own interrelated rationales. Here, the 
economy has been divided into 35 different industries (see Appendix A), according to WIOD 
(Dietzenbacher et al., 2013). As stated in section 3.1.2, the total final demand provided by 
scenarios unfolds disparately amongst the 35 sectors. What is more, whether this demand is made 
by household consumption or by gross fixed capital formation (investments) depends on income 
distribution (see section 3.1.1).  
As described in Eq. 10, energy demand depends on the economic structure (𝐿), energy 
intensities (ê𝑘  ) and final demand (𝐷). Thus, the column sum of the result of pre-multiplying ê𝑘  
by 𝐿 yields the energy multipliers shown in Table 2 for 2009. These multipliers can be interpreted 
as the sectoral energy sensitivity to final demand (GDP) growth by final end-use energy carrier. 
For instance, it takes 1.260 EJ of electricity to satisfy 1 trillion USD of additional final demand 
for sector 1 (see Table 1) products. Thus, having a less energy-intensive economy, measured as 
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the energy consumption required to satisfy the same GDP, relies on energy intensity and economic 
structure. Hence, a less energy-intensive economy could be achieved through reductions in energy 
intensity (efficiency gains), a less input-consuming productive process (downsizing the overall 
values of  𝑎𝑖𝑗 in the A Matrix) or, conversely, an increase in one of them not high enough to offset 
the reduction in the other.  
Sector Electricity Gas Heat Liquids Solids 
1 1.260 0.802 0.173 3.996 0.757 
2 1.907 5.580 0.308 2.179 1.737 
3 1.430 1.147 0.293 2.917 1.925 
4 2.135 1.317 0.525 2.601 1.647 
5 1.482 1.049 0.335 2.603 1.355 
6 1.909 1.208 0.423 2.985 2.786 
7 2.218 1.365 0.515 2.045 2.911 
8 2.071 5.170 1.017 10.005 1.788 
9 2.858 2.997 1.055 3.353 2.168 
10 3.446 2.539 0.670 3.913 3.972 
11 3.414 3.362 0.362 4.062 10.724 
12 4.259 2.972 0.504 2.341 5.081 
13 1.858 1.276 0.267 1.822 1.798 
14 1.467 0.997 0.209 1.618 1.295 
15 1.731 1.195 0.276 1.830 1.584 
16 2.047 1.674 0.418 3.258 2.403 
17 3.958 4.320 0.394 1.841 3.451 
18 1.437 1.288 0.204 2.503 2.138 
19 0.904 0.597 0.127 1.477 0.553 
20 0.507 0.346 0.094 1.352 0.273 
21 0.797 0.463 0.089 1.645 0.280 
22 1.469 0.963 0.163 2.241 1.052 
23 1.070 2.384 0.139 7.855 0.609 
24 0.636 0.800 0.163 30.073 0.512 
25 0.715 0.914 0.182 28.052 0.566 
26 1.069 0.838 0.216 4.772 0.585 
27 0.638 0.514 0.082 1.193 0.305 
28 0.437 0.270 0.060 0.862 0.209 
29 0.500 0.264 0.082 0.503 0.220 
30 0.604 0.435 0.088 1.368 0.358 
31 1.005 1.230 0.126 1.773 0.503 
32 1.107 0.538 0.128 1.519 0.444 
33 0.942 0.645 0.162 1.625 0.525 
34 0.994 0.660 0.170 1.967 0.534 
35 0.171 0.374 0.027 0.279 0.146 
Table 2. Energy sensitivity to final demand growth by resources (EJ/trillion USD). Source: Own elaboration on 
the basis of WIOD and IEA. 
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Table 3 provides useful information for policy-makers for selecting the appropriate 
sectors to undertake different policies. Despite industrial policy, i.e. the administration’s 
encouragement of key sectors to the detriment of others, has been ruled out during the last 
decades, it emerges as a useful tool to achieve climate goals. Thus, industrial policy could focus 
on reducing the weight in the economy of the most energy-intensive sectors or increasing the less 
energy-intensive sectors as in the PG scenario (see Appendix B) In addition, it can be used to 
identify the most sensitive energy source to satisfy economic demand. For instance, energy 
carriers from liquids to increase GDP are the highest, especially in the transport sectors (23-25), 
fossil fuel refineries (8) and even the primary sector (1). These facts explain why liquid limits are 
the first to be significantly found and why it causes the deeper output impact when it occurs, when 
compared with other final end-use energy carriers such as solids.  
By definition, the BAU scenario’s assumptions make it considerably energy-demanding. 
Firstly, since energy transition policies are not as important as they are in the other scenarios, 
energy intensities decline slower. Secondly, if the technical coefficients (A matrix) were to evolve 
following the historical projection, the world might move towards a more inefficient economic 
system. As mentioned in section 3.1.3, the more intermediate products purchases required to 
produce each industry’s output, the smaller the share remaining for the gross value added (wages 
and profits as it is measured at factor costs). Therefore, to avoid unrealistic outcomes, the A matrix 
in the BAU scenario is not allowed to decrease the value added beyond one third of its initial 
share by sector (see Appendix B).  
Conversely, the Green Growth scenario experiences a higher energy intensity drop and 
the economy moves towards a more efficient structure. As the A matrix comes closer to 
Denmark’s structure, obtaining the same GDP growth requires less production in each period. 
Nevertheless, a rebound effect appears due to the increased capacity of the economy to boost final 
demand. As a result, the efficiency gains are partially offset and total energy requirements 
increase by approximately 10% in 2030, although it manages to decrease the mentioned 
requirements by 13% in 2050 (see Figure 9).  Lastly, the Post-Growth scenario simulates an 
industrial policy focused on favouring less energy-intensive sectors such as, ‘Education’, ‘Health 
and Social Work’ or ‘Other Community, Social and Personal Services’, while disfavouring others 
like ‘Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear fuel’, ‘Air transport’ or ‘Chemicals and Chemical 
products’. This approach (Leontief and Duchin, 1986) allows the model to explore an energy-
focused industrial transformation. As a result, along with a steady decline in GDP growth, the PG 
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scenario decreases its total energy needs by 17% in 2030 and 44% in 2050, according to the total 
effects shown in Figure 9.  
Besides, Input-Output Analysis allows us to accurately differentiate between direct 
effects (those triggered by the variation in demand itself) and indirect effects (those activated by 
the spill-over to deliver intermediate inputs across industries) by energy resources (see Appendix 
C). Figure 9 shows the total contribution of both direct and indirect effects to energy growth, 
which always sum 100%, as well as the total final energy demand variation by 2030 and 2050 
(total effects, in dotted lines). The results shown in Figure 9 are only valid for simulations 
accounting with energy limits, so the energy use reported here is linked to the energy emissions 
and GDP growth shown in Figs. 7 and 8 labelled as ‘Limits’. The bars with a positive value –
looking rightwards- indicate that the effect (direct or indirect) contributed to the total energy use 
change by 2050 with the same sign, and the other way around. For instance, in the GG scenario, 
the solids’ use is 12% lower in 2050. The indirect effects, i.e. the contribution of the intermediate 
products’ trade flows between industries highly contributed to this reduction (partly due to the A 
matrix change and partly by the industries’ energy efficiency gains). Conversely, the direct effects 
triggered by an increased final demand weakened the energy use reduction capacity of the indirect 
effects, so the total final decrease in solids’ use is lower.  
As an overall result, the significant importance of the contribution of indirect effects to 
the total energy demand variation, even pushing in the opposite direction to direct effects, 
underlines the relevance of integrating Input-Output Analysis into IAMs. This can be clearly seen 
in the PG scenario, where in spite of the direct contribution to reduce energy demand via a decline 
in GDP growth, indirect effects strongly oversize them. The shift in the intermediate structure of 
the economy accounts 57% of the responsibility in solids’ use reduction (-50%), 53% in heat (-
58%) and 42% in liquids (-67%). Moreover, the indirect effects are able to reduce electricity use 
despite the pressure to be increased by direct effects –bar looking leftwards while total effects 
being negative- in the context of a strong electrification process. The same can be applied to gases, 
considered a ‘bridge’ resource in the energy transition. As a consequence, we can conclude that 
without an important economic structure transformation, climate goals could hardly be met since 
GHG emissions are strongly linked to energy use (see Figure 7). The total effects show that the 
total energy demand is still increasing with the BAU (+12%) and GG scenarios (+10%) by 2030; 
whereas the PG is already declining (-17%). This explains the inability of any scenario other than 
PG to reduce emissions before 2030 (Figure 7). 
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 The energy demand decline in the BAU scenario (2050) is mostly due to direct effects: 
the reduction in final demand imposed by energy scarcity would be the main driver of the energy 
demand downsizing. Nevertheless, for electricity demand, indirect and direct effects contribute 
to the energy demand variation in different ways resulting in an overall increase.  The electricity 
use is increased by 2050 (8%) basically due to the energy mix tendency to electrify and the more 
inefficient economic structure. As a consequence, electricity use increases despite the economic 
downturn which leads GDP (direct effects) to decrease. The relatively lower reduction in the 
liquids use and the lack of an intense shift in the electricity mix to renewables explain why GHG 
emissions (Fig.7) increase even though the economic system is in recession. The more inefficient 
A matrix structure leads the indirect effects to increase electricity demand, whereas energy 
intensities drop, bringing about an overall decline thanks to the direct effects. The contribution to 
the decline in energy demand in the GG scenario is also evident, with even a reduction in the 
energy demand in those resources that actually increased (electricity and gases). As mentioned 
before, the indirect effects were the main driver of the decline in energy demand in the post-
growth scenario, highlighting the relevance of industrial policy along with energy efficiency 
gains.  
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Figure 9. Direct and indirect contribution to energy demand variation by final end-use energy carriers and 
scenarios. 
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5. Concluding remarks and Policy Implications 
Within the last few decades, the need to include environmental aspects into macro-
economic modelling has drawn increasing academic attention. Considering that most of the 
carbon emissions are produced within the energy sector and regarding its nexus with economic 
growth, it makes sense to focus on Energy-Economy-Environmental models. The review of the 
literature reveals a lack of consideration in simulation models to the role of energy availability 
and its potential effect on limiting production in the economic system. What is more, there is a 
theoretical discussion on whether economic growth can be compatible with, or even boost, low-
carbon transitions. Since rapidly tackling climate change while keeping or improving wellbeing 
imposes an urgent agenda, more accurate outcomes from modelling and discussion on their policy 
implications is of the utmost importance. According to the IPCC, emissions should plummet from 
-41% to -72% by 2050, with respect to 2010, in order to make avoiding a world temperature 
increase of above 2ºC ‘likely’.  
The results expose the unfeasibility of economic growth once biophysical constraints 
have been considered. Although the BAU scenario copes with energy limits at an early stage due 
to a lack of energy mix transition to renewables; this policy shows itself to be ineffective when 
the GDP growth rate is increased in the GG scenario. Essentially, the deployment time, 
diminishing EROEI and sectoral hurdles to switch to renewables collide with the growing energy 
requirements imposed by GDP growth. Thus, the energy system needs to draw on non-renewable 
energy resources to meet the increasing energy demand, which eventually becomes higher than 
the energy availability, resulting in a declining trend of the economic output. It is only after the 
economic slow-down that emissions start decreasing, but not soon enough to meet climate 
objectives. Conversely, a planned steady decline in GDP growth displayed by the PG scenario, 
along with industrial policy fostering less energy-intensive sectors, leads to better climate 
outcomes (well below 2ºC), while completing the energy transition and enhancing income 
distribution.  
The implications for policy-makers lie in the scenario results. Firstly, the differences 
between the BAU and the other scenarios show that it might be better ‘to do something’ than ‘to 
do nothing’. Should the energy transition not be undertaken soon with credible, strong policies 
by the countries, the world might face economic stagnation and then depression in the coming 
decades. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a mere technological energy switch to 
renewables could be unfeasible if not complemented with huge socioeconomic changes. As 
shown by the results, the economic costs of keeping GDP growth as the main objective of 
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economic-policy could be too high to be socially affordable. Thus, we believe that economic 
policy should be redirected to redistributional and industrial policies. In addition, energy demand 
policies should not only aim at improving energy efficiency, but also designing multidisciplinary 
demand management policies intended to satisfy human needs by means of collectively less 
energy-intensive ways. Short distribution channels, a switch from modern to traditional or 
ecological agriculture and farming, favouring public and collective transport and planning 
industrial ecology developments, amongst other policies, might contribute to human well-being 
in an energy and GDP declining context. Also, focusing on more labour intensive sectors such as 
education, health care or social work together with working time reduction policies could be 
important to address employment in a low-carbon economy. 
It certainly raises deep theoretical implications and further challenges for development 
economics, ecological economics, well-being and economic analysis in general.  First, although 
it becomes ineffective to deliver well-being beyond a certain level of economic growth (Jackson, 
2011), most non-developed countries have not yet reached that threshold. Thus, development 
studies may need to lean towards non-extractivist, post-growth approaches in order to achieve the 
most meaningful results possible. The reduction of economic output, either planned or unplanned, 
suggests the need to implement regional redistribution policies to improve the welfare of 
developing countries. Moreover, economic growth theory should include biophysical boundaries 
that fit reality better. The MEDEAS model shows that economic growth might be unachievable 
in the context of the energy challenges that the world urgently needs to tackle. As a consequence, 
macroeconomic modelling should consider absolute biophysical constraints if more accurate 
outcomes are to be obtained. Conventional production functions could be failing to capture these 
absolute restraints by compensating for natural capital depletion with capital accumulation, labour 
growth, or even the so-called total factors productivity. Therefore, if models only include the 
environment as theoretical categories –such as ‘natural capital’ or ‘ecosystem services’- which 
can be eroded but restored, they could be disregarding irreversibility in natural systems and thus 
obtaining misleading results. Furthermore, there is a lack of high, two-way integration between 
the economy and the biophysical system in IAMs that MEDEAS could contribute to cover. More 
complex insights are required to better represent the real world dynamics, subject to irreversibility 
when the consumption of resources is being assessed.  
Finally, in order to improve the accuracy of the economic model, further developments 
should be addressed in the future. Firstly, the full endogenisation of inequality could enhance the 
final demand estimation, setting the basis to include the financial structure in the model. The latter 
will allow the model to analyse the financial requirements of the energy transition by tracking 
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more accurately the investment flows to the energy-related sectors. Secondly, the endogenous A 
matrix evolution, linked to the energy mix transition and technological change, would be a great 
step forward in the dynamic representation of the economic structure in the model. This would 
also contribute to enhance the linkage between the energy mix and energy-related sectors in the 
IOT. Thirdly, considering this, demand management policies should be measured and then 
implemented in the model. Thus, an effective decoupling between well-being and GDP growth 
could be assessed.  
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Appendix A. List of industries 
 
 
Sectors 
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing 
18 Construction 
2 Mining and Quarrying 19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail sail of fuel 
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, 
Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
4 Textiles and Textile Products 21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles; Repair of Household goods 
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 22 Hotels and Restaurants 
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Corks 23 Inland Transport 
7 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 24 Water Transport 
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear fuel 25 Air Transport 
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport 
Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies 
10 Rubber and Plastics 27 Post and Telecommunications 
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 28 Financial Intermediation 
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 29 Real Estate Activities 
13 Machinery, Nec 30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business 
Activities 
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory 
Social Security 
15 Transport Equipment 32 Education 
16 Manufacturing , Nec.; Recycling 33 Health and Social Work 
17 Electricity, Gas and Water supply 34 Other Community, Social and Personal 
Services 
  35 Private Households with Employed Persons 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of WIOD (Dietzenbacher et al., 2013) 
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Appendix B. Target matrices for the World model. 
BAU- Gradually evolving from 2020 to 2050 at historical rates, limited to maintain the 
consistency of accounting balances. The historical average growth rate of every component of the 
A matrix is estimated, i.e. 1225 rates. Then every A matrix component 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is projected applying 
its average growth rate. This can lead to inconsistencies that have been avoided: 
Total intermediate inputs proportion being higher than 1 or lower than zero. For this 
purpose, 1 and 0 were set as maximum and minimum for this proportion respectively.  
Total intermediate inputs proportion being high or low enough to reduce or increase gross 
value added in an unrealistic way. Gross value added proportion over sectoral output can only be 
1/3 higher or lower than its initial value. 
For instance, sector 2 has an intermediate inputs’ share of 0.318 as its last observed value 
and starts declining after 2020. It only decreases 0.275 by 2050 with a gross value added share 
0.725. Otherwise it could have led to gross value added being 95% of total output or even lower 
than zero. Nevertheless, the most common situation is technical coefficients going higher and 
therefore, reducing the economy’s capability to create gross value added out of production. This 
system allows the BAU scenario continue its current trajectory avoiding gross value added to 
shrink.  
Green growth- Denmark A Matrix (last observation). The Denmark’s IOT was 
transformed into a one-region matrix, incorporating intermediate inputs from imports to the 
purchases made by Denmark’s sectors domestically. Additionally, exports have been considered 
as domestic sales. This way, we can evaluate the economic performance of the global economy 
(where imports are equal to exports) if its sectoral trade flows had the same structure as Denmark, 
one of the most important countries in terms of domestic sustainability, and a European, modern 
and efficient country.  
Post-growth- Ad-hoc matrix fostering less energy-intensive sectors and improving the 
efficiency of the energy producing sector. Method: increasing sales weights (row coefficients) 
and reducing purchases weights (column coefficients), respectively, by a factor (see Figure A.3). 
By affecting the technical coefficients by rows, the implicit assumption is that every sector will 
purchase more (or less) intermediate products or services from the sector that is being modified. 
For instance, if we want to evaluate in this scenario a situation whereby all the economy is going 
to transit to electrification, is to be expected that all industries will increase their purchases from 
sector 17 (see Appendix A). This would imply that the proportion in which sectors will use 
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products from sector 17 over their total output will be higher. As a consequence, row 17 of the 
technical coefficients matrix is multiplied by 1.40 factor. Analogously, by predicting a less 
material-intensive future within the Post-Growth scenario, a 10% reduction in intermediate 
consumption is operated by multiplying by a 0.90 factor by columns. These row and column 
factors can be seen broken down by sectors below the target matrix.  
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BAU final A matrix (World level) and different year's sum of columns (share of intermediate products on total output) 
 
Own elaboration.  
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Green growth scenario target A matrix (World level) 
 
Own elaboration from WIOD (Dietzenbacher et al., 2013) 
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Post growth scenario A matrix (World level) 
 
Own elaboration 
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Appendix C. Direct and indirect effects 
Input-Output Analysis (IOA) allows the sectoral production required to satisfy an 
exogenous variation in demand to be calculated. As we already know, IOA encompasses the set 
of inputs that each industry needs from the others in order to produce its output (technical 
coefficients). Thus, by means of this structure, the variation in final demand not only triggers a 
direct reaction in economic output, but also an indirect one, regarding the cross-industry demand 
for intermediate products. Hence, IOA lets us separate the total effects of a variation in final 
demand between direct effects and indirect effects on production. As the total production (on the 
demand side) equals the row sum of sectoral intermediate consumption, plus sectoral final 
demand, both figures would represent indirect and direct effects, respectively. Moreover, by using 
energy coefficients (i.e., energy intensities), we can obtain energy carriers from each effect. Since 
MEDEAS-World takes household energy consumption separately (Eq.10), additional 
arrangements must be made to correctly track the energy carriers of direct effects. Therefore, 
considering that  fd=x-Z, the indirect and direct energy carrier effects are calculated as follows: 
𝐃𝐄𝐤𝐢 = ?̂?𝐤𝐢 •   (𝐱′ − 𝐫′) + 𝐡𝐡_?̂?𝐤𝐢 • 𝐜             Eq. C.1  
 
                                𝐈𝐄𝐤𝐢 =  ?̂?𝐤𝐢  • 𝐫′                           Eq. C.2 
where  𝐃𝐄𝐤𝐢 and 𝐈𝐄𝐤𝐢 are both direct and indirect energy carrier effects, 𝐫′ is the row 
vector of the row’s sum of intermediate consumption by industry ‘i’ (∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑗
35
𝑗=1 ), ?̂?
𝐤𝐢 is the energy 
intensities by sector and 𝐡𝐡_?̂?𝐤𝐢 household energy intensity (both intensities’ diagonal matrices 
equal to those in section 3.1.4 since sectors ‘i’=sectors ‘j’), 𝐜 stands for the households’ demand 
for industry i's products and 𝐱′ the row vector of economic output. In order to check the validity 
of  Eqs. A.1 and A.2, let us define the total effects (TEki) as the sum of both:  
𝐓𝐄𝐤𝐢 = ?̂?𝐤𝐢 •   (𝐱′ − 𝐫′) + 𝐡𝐡?̂?
𝐤𝐢
• 𝐜 + ?̂?𝐤𝐢  • 𝐫′            Eq. C.3 
and then, operating: 
𝐓𝐄𝐤𝐢 = ?̂?𝐤𝐢 •  (𝐱′ − 𝐫′ + 𝒓′) + 𝐡𝐡?̂?
𝐤𝐢
• 𝐜 = ?̂?𝐤𝐢 • (𝐱′) + 𝐡𝐡_?̂?𝐤𝐢  • 𝐜            Eq. A.4 
which, considering that x’=x and sectors ‘i’ and ‘j’ are equal but by rows and columns 
respectively, exactly equals Eq.10
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Appendix D. World Economy module views 
 'DEM-ECON. Investment and Households' View in MEDEAS-World. 
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'ECON. Economic structure - A matrix evolution' view in MEDEAS-World.
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'DEM ECON - Income. Labour and capital compensation' view in MEDEAS-World.  
57 
 
 
 
 
'ECON. Confrontation demand with limits' view in MEDEAS-World.  
